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Abstract—After treating the notification of vulnerable par-
ties as mere side-notes in research, the security community
has recently put more focus on how to conduct vulnerability
disclosure at scale. The first works in this area have shown
that while notifications are helpful to a significant fraction
of operators, the vast majority of systems remain unpatched.
In this paper, we build on these previous works, aiming to
understand why the effects are not more significant. To that
end, we report on a notification experiment targeting more than
24,000 domains, which allowed us to analyze what technical and
human aspects are roadblocks to a successful campaign. As part
of this experiment, we explored potential alternative notification
channels beyond email, including social media and phone. In
addition, we conducted an anonymous survey with the notified
operators, investigating their perspectives on our notifications.
We show the pitfalls of email-based communications, such as
the impact of anti-spam filters, the lack of trust by recipients,
and the hesitation in fixing vulnerabilities despite awareness.
However, our exploration of alternative communication channels
did not suggest a more promising medium. Seeing these results,
we pinpoint future directions in improving security notifications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Large-scale discovery of vulnerabilities on the Internet has
become frequent over the last few years. With the widespread
adoption of content management systems such as WordPress,
Joomla, or Drupal, vulnerabilities in these programs result in
a large number of vulnerable Web sites. In addition, insecure
configurations may allow attackers to exploit systems, such as
retrieving sensitive data like cryptographic key material [3].
For researchers and attackers alike, detection of such issues
is often fairly straightforward: given a seed list of domains or
hosts, they can efficiently scan for existing security issues.
Considering the relative ease by which miscreants can
identify and exploit vulnerable systems, it is vital to quickly
and effectively inform affected parties. For example, the Dru-
pageddon flaw in 2014 [11] allowed attackers to backdoor
thousands of hosts within seven hours after the vulnerability
had become publicly known. Thus, the security community
must focus not only on discovering vulnerabilities, but also on
determining effective ways of notifying those vulnerable.
How to properly perform such notification is non-trivial,
particularly considering the heterogeneity of Web site and
system administrators. Two of our recent works [19, 25]
independently studied how vulnerability notifications can be
conducted at scale, i.e., for a large number of vulnerable Web
sites and network services. Our results show that such large-
scale notifications have promise in spurring remediation, but
currently to an unsatisfactory degree. Both studies identified
that a roadblock to success was the reachability of correct
contacts. By tracking which administrators viewed detailed
technical vulnerability reports, the studies also found another
challenge: even after viewing such reports, a large fraction of
administrators still did not take corrective steps.
We continue this line of research and aim to better un-
derstand influencing factors for the success of a large-scale
notification campaign. Specifically, we investigate what impact
technical measures such as spam filters have on the initial
email delivery’s success. Based on the insights from prior
work, the delivery status remains unknown for large body of
sent emails. We therefore investigate whether this unknown
state is caused solely by mail servers which mark emails as
spam, or if the reason is non-technical, i.e., caused by admin-
istrators who do not follow up on the provided information.
To achieve this goal, we conducted an automated large-scale
notification for two types of Web vulnerabilities using different
types and formats of notification emails.
Although emails are a convenient way of disseminating
vulnerability information at scale, it is unclear how they com-
pare with other channels, which cannot be as easily automated
as email sending. To that end, we investigate the feasibility
of using channels that require additional costs (e.g., physical
mail), rely on manual acquisition of contacts points (e.g., social
media), or even demand high-effort interactions (e.g., calling
site owners). We analyze how these alternative disclosure
channels compare to a fully-automated approach via email.
Apart from the technical feasibility of conducting notifica-
tions, it is also important to understand how the users perceive
notifications, e.g., whether they discard the messages due to a
lack of trust. To understand more about the administrators’
perspectives, we conducted an anonymous survey with the
site owners we previously notified about security issues, and
summarize the most important insights from their feedback.
Since the field of vulnerability notification at scale is still
in its infancy, our work not only aims at tackling the previously
described research questions, but also identifies areas in which
further research should be conducted to improve the quality
and success of large-scale vulnerability disclosure.
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Contributions and Outline
To summarize, our paper makes the following contributions:
• After presenting our methodology in Section II, we report
on the results of an automated notification campaign for
more than 24,000 domains, affected by two distinctly
different types of vulnerabilities (Section III).
• With the data gathered from the notification campaign, in
Section IV we analyze in-depth the technical and human
aspects of a notification campaign, and provide insights
into parameters for the success of such a campaign.
• In Section V, we report on an experiment involving
manual communication channels and how these compare
to a fully automated email approach.
• By characterizing the responses to the anonymous survey
we distributed to notified operators, in Section VI we
discuss the administrators’ perspectives on notifications
and highlight ways of improving the notification process.
• Finally, based on our study as well as the prior work, we
outline directions for promising research to ensure that
vulnerability notifications can become more effective in
the future (Section VII).
II. METHODOLOGY
The goal of our study is to illuminate what factors may
influence the success of large-scale notifications on security
issues. To accomplish this, we conducted controlled multi-
variate notification experiments. In this section, we present
our experiment methodology. We first describe the security
issues we distributed notifications for and then outline our
procedure for conducting automated notification campaigns.
Following these campaigns, we explored manual notifications
along different communication channels to investigate alter-
native methods to automated email notifications. Finally, we
distributed an anonymous survey to notified contacts to gain
insight on the characteristics of respondents, their views on our
notifications, and shortcomings in our process. For additional
data, such as the notification messages and survey we used,
please see our GitHub repository [1].
A. Targeted Security Issues
Similar to our prior work [25], we focused on security
issues on Web sites that could be easily detected without
interfering with normal server operations. Our first two security
issues were recent (at the time of the experiments) cross-
site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in WordPress, CVE-2016-
4566 and CVE-2016-4567. Both vulnerabilities impact im-
ported modules and reside in static files, allowing us to detect
vulnerable sites by downloading the affected resources and
comparing the file hashes to known vulnerable ones. As these
issues were fixed in several branches of WordPress, affected
webmasters merely needed to update WordPress to the latest
version in their currently used branch. We refer to the data set
collected for these Web sites as WP throughout the paper.
Our other security issue was publicly accessible Git repos-
itories. Since Git is a distributed versioning system, every
machine that has checked out a repository has a copy of its
complete history. By default, Git stores both configurations and
the actual repository data in the .git directory. If publicly
accessible, an attacker can reconstruct the complete repository
and inspect the source code, potentially uncovering hardcoded
secrets such as database logins, API credentials, and crypto-
graphic keys. To detect if a site contained such a repository
in its public Web directory, we checked for access to the
file .git/config. Some Web sites may have intentionally
exposed a repository as public. To avoid notifying those
webmasters, we inspected the .git/refs/heads/master
file, which contains the hash of the last commit. We searched
for the existence of that commit hash on Github, the most
widely used Git hosting platform, and only marked a site as
vulnerable if no public commit was identified. Although this
approach does not eliminate all false positives, we believe
that it removes a large fraction of them without requiring
us to download the Git repositories and check for sensitive
information. We refer to the data set collected for these sites
as Git throughout the paper.
We initially also identified Web sites with publicly accessi-
ble core dump files, which can contain sensitive data dumped
from a crashed process’s memory. However, in the course of
our notification campaign, we discovered that a single hosting
provider was responsible for approximately 30% of affected
domains. Given the limited data set of 790 domains that were
affected by core dumps in total, we excluded this data set as
the impact of this single hosting provider was too large to
allow for a meaningful analysis.
Finally, to allow for a sound analysis, we only considered
domains which were vulnerable to exactly one type of flaw,
e.g., domains with WordPress vulnerabilities and a publicly
accessible Git repository were excluded from our experiments
(682 domains in total).
B. Automated Notification Experiments
The first component of our study was an automated email
notification campaign. Here, we detail which email contacts
we used and what notification messages we sent.
Notification Contacts — Previous notification studies [19,
25] used both direct and indirect (e.g., intermediaries such
as CERTs) communication channels. Indirect channels were
found to be less effective, as many intermediaries did not
forward the provided information. As a result, we chose to only
focus on direct channels for Web sites, such as those used in
[25]. While the prior studies measured the effectiveness of each
channel in isolation, we instead sent notifications for a given
domain to both available channels, summarized as follows:
Domain WHOIS Information — The Domain WHOIS database
contains a wide array of information about domain names,
which can be queried from anyone. However, WHOIS docu-
ments are structured for human readability and do not have
a consistent format. Furthermore, WHOIS providers may rate
limit database queries and can employ CAPTCHAs to prevent
data scraping. Instead of parsing the output, we used the
WhoisXML API (whoisxmlapi.com) for the domains in
our data set to extract contact emails in February 2017.
Generic Email Addresses — Generic email addresses are
standardized email usernames to be used when contacting
personnel of an organization, as defined in RFC 2142 [8].
Amongst these, we selected security or administrator oriented
addresses: security@, abuse@, and webmaster@. We
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additionally included info@ in hopes of potentially reaching
a front office for the organizations we contacted.
Notification Messages — In our analysis, we aim to under-
stand whether different types of messages impact the success
of a notification campaign. Thus, we used six different types
of messages, which we describe below.
Plaintext Emails — The first group of messages were three
different kinds of plaintext emails.
Regular Sender (Plain): The first type of message was
a plaintext email according to RFC 2822 [24]. The email
sender and the displayed sender name was Ben Stock
<ben.stock@notify.cispa.uni-saarland.de>.
The message contained a list describing the identified
security issues and instructions to retrieve a detailed technical
vulnerability report (see our GitHub repository [1]). Such
reports could be retrieved either with an email reply or on our
Web interface (linked to in our email). Access to the report
was secured with a secret token. To retrieve the report via
email, this token needed to be extracted from the message and
put in the subject when replying to our mail bot. Similarly,
the token was contained in the URL to our Web interface,
allowing us to determine when a report was accessed.
S/MIME Email (S/MIME): Considering the potential sen-
sitivity of vulnerability notification messages, unsigned mes-
sages may cause distrust and raise concerns about sender
intentions. To determine whether a verifiable sender has any
impact on the success of our campaign, we used the same email
text as Plain, but signed with a valid S/MIME certificate [23].
To ensure that our programmatically generated signature was
correct, we verified that the signature was correctly interpreted
by the Thunderbird, Apple Mail, and Microsoft Outlook.
Mailbot (Mailbot): The third variant of a plaintext email
contained the same messages as Plain and S/MIME. However,
to investigate whether the sender name has any impact, we
modified the sender email address and displayed name to be
Vulnerability Notification <notify@...>. As
in Plain, we did not sign emails.
HTML-based Emails — The second group of messages were
two types of HTML-based emails.
HTML Email with External Resource (Tracking): Previous
work [19, 25] observed that a substantial portion of notified
contacts who did not take action remained in an unknown
state. While no remediation was observed, it was unclear
whether the message was not received by an appropriate party,
or instead ignored. To better understand whether recipients
receive a notification but choose to not act on it, we crafted
an HTML email as depicted in Figure 1. The message content
itself matched Plain, but we added the logo of our institution.
Instead of directly attaching the image, we linked to an image
hosted on our own server. The image URL was unique for
each recipient, allowing us to learn that the email was indeed
opened. Note that for each recipient, we only record the single
bit of information on whether the image was loaded. We do not
log IP addresses or any other potentially personal identifiers.
However, if the resource request arrived from a blacklisted set
of IP address associated with anti-virus and other services that
scan URLs in emails in transit, we do not factor that request
when marking a recipient as having read our message.
Fig. 1. Template of the HTML emails
HTML Email (HTML): While the tracking logo allowed us
to learn that an email was indeed opened, mail clients that
do not automatically retrieve external resources actively warn
users about the privacy risks. To understand if these messages
would have a negative influence on our campaign, we created
another HTML email template with the image as an attachment
(hence it does not trigger external resource warnings).
Tone — In the final message group, we varied the message
tone compared to the previous message types.
Friendly (Friendly): We selected to establish first contact
with a friendlier non-technical message, excluding any links
and detailed information about the security issues. Instead, we
informed the recipient that we had discovered a security issue,
asking them to provide an email address in charge of handling
such reports. We also added our institution’s default email
signature with contact details to allow for recipients to vet us as
a sender (see our GitHub repository [1]). When we received
the correct point of contact, we manually sent the complete
report information, as accessible via our Web interface.
When designing this final message type, we had no ex-
pectations about whether it would be perceived better, or if it
would raise suspicion in the recipients. However, we consider
it important to measure if such a change in tone can make a
difference.
Measurements — To compare the effectiveness of the various
message types, we collected the following measurements:
Fixed Domains Over Time — We monitored the Web sites
detected as affected by a security issue, and determined if and
when the site remediated. Our monitoring system checked for
the security issue using the same method as used for detection,
visiting each site daily. Temporary network and server outages
can result in incorrect detection of remediation. Thus, after first
detecting a site as fixed on a given date, we continued checking
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for the following seven days and consider the domain fixed on
that date if it did not appear affected again.
Report Access — Our notification recipients could access a
detailed technical report on the security issue by either replying
to our email messages or accessing our Web interface (with the
secret token). For each domain, we recorded if and when we
observed an email response or Web site visit with its associated
token. For the Friendly group, our initial message did not
include detailed information about the security issues or any
links, and site operators were to request more information. We
marked the report as accessed when we replied with the report
(within at most 12 hours after receiving a request).
Email Delivery Status — To determine if message delivery
failed to certain recipients, we checked the email inboxes of
our senders for email bounces. For our Tracking group, we
monitored for retrievals of our image resources, unique to each
recipient (without logging IP addresses or other identifiers).
Experiment Parameters — On January 30th, 2017, we
checked the Alexa Top 1M for the presence of one of the
outlined security issues. We then randomly assigned the sites
into seven groups as shown in Table I: one for each email
variant and an unnotified control group. All groups except
for Friendly contained approximately 4,000 domains in total.
As manual interaction was required for recipients of Friendly
messages, we limited the number of domains in this group
to 1,000 sites. As previously mentioned, we initially also
considered core dumps, but removed them during the course
of our experiments as the diversity of recipients was too low.
Additionally, administrators for 395 domains requested to opt
out of any notification or further analysis. Table I shows the
final population sizes for each group after those contacts were
removed. The notification campaign started on February 3rd,
2017 and lasted six weeks. We sent two reminders on February
17th and on March 3rd.
C. Manual Notification Experiments
Automated email disclosures may be tenable, but may not
be the most effective method of notification. Prior work [19,
25] observed that a significant fraction of notified contacts
exhibited no responses. To explore alternative notification
options, we followed up our email notifications with five dif-
ferent forms of manual notifications, including communication
channels that may be challenging to automate delivery for.
Given the manual nature of these efforts, we chose to
focus on the Web sites that did not react to our notifications
(i.e., those who did not remediate or respond to our mes-
sages), as we may uncover a better method of reaching these
webmasters. In particular, we reached out to email addresses,
Groups Git WP Total
Plain 1,561 2,371 3,932
S/MIME 1,559 2,374 3,933
Mailbot 1,560 2,371 3,931
Tracking 1,548 2,370 3,918
HTML 1,565 2,371 3,936
Friendly 367 585 952
Control 1,561 2,373 3,934
TABLE I. SIZE OF OUR NOTIFICATION GROUPS
phone numbers, and postal addresses listed on affected Web
sites, and submitted “contact us” web forms. We also searched
the sites for links to their social media accounts on Twitter
and Facebook. We describe the method behind our manual
notifications in more detail in Section V. We collected the
same measurements as with the automated email notifications.
D. Recipient Survey
Our automated and manual notification experiments al-
lowed us to observe the externally visible effects of our
outreach efforts. However, to gain insights on site operator
perspectives, we distributed surveys to recipients we had
emailed the notifications to. Our survey extends beyond those
sent in prior studies [13, 19] to notification recipients, which
focused on the acceptability of the notifications. In our survey,
we additionally aim to understand the demographics of our re-
cipients, their prior experiences with security notifications and
reports, reasons behind the observed remediation behaviors,
and suggestions for improvements to our notification process.
The details of our survey are described in Section VI.
E. Ethical Considerations
We note that our primary institution does not provide an
IRB nor mandate (or enable) approval for such experiments.
However, as described next, we took great care to ensure the
privacy of message recipients in our experiments.
We designed our detection of security issues to minimize
the impact on Web sites. To reduce load on Web sites, we only
checked each site once a day, and our detection methods only
required requesting a public static resource file, which does
not interfere with normal server operations. We respected any
opt-out requests and extensively tested our detection methods
prior to their deployments.
The ethics of performing security notifications themselves
are not fully settled, although a number of prior notification
studies [6, 13, 17, 19, 25] have set a precedence for acceptable
notifications. In particular, surveys in two prior studies [13, 19]
documented the acceptability and helpfulness of these no-
tifications in the eyes of message recipients. We likewise
believe that the potential good from informing vulnerable hosts
outweighs the potential risks and costs. Following the best
practices outlined in these previous notification efforts, we re-
spect requests to opt-out of our notifications. Additionally, we
attempted to message all unnotified contacts at the conclusion
of our study (such as those in our control groups). We offered a
feedback channel through an anonymous survey for the notified
organizations, which followed best practices, e.g., it was fully
anonymous and optional. We note that we only collected data
on organization decisions and not individuals, thus our study
does not constitute human subjects research.
Our experiments did rely on the ability to monitor resource
requests to our servers, which could potentially be used for
tracking and violating the privacy of notification recipients.
However, we employed safeguards to ensure that no private
information was collected. We did not log IP addresses or
any identifiers for any resource requests except for the random
token unique to each recipient. This only allowed us to learn
if that recipient or domain performed a specific action (visited
our web interface or opened our email), and nothing else
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Fig. 2. Non-exploitable Git domains over time
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Fig. 3. Non-exploitable WP domains over time
about the recipient. We only report aggregate results from this
monitoring, without ever revealing the outcome for a particular
domain or recipient. We believe the insights we can gain from
this monitoring can significantly improve our understanding of
notifications at a reduced risk to message recipients.
III. REMEDIATION BEHAVIOR
Here we describe the details of our automated email
notifications and the observed remediation from affected sites.
A. Remediation Levels
Table II shows the number of remediated Web sites at the
end of our campaign (March 17th). For the control group,
13% and 14% of the domains were fixed for Git and WP
respectively. For Git, the notified domains had a fix rate of
approximately 24%, whereas for WP, the average fix rate
was merely 17%. The impact of notifications for the WP
groups may be influenced by WordPress’s automatic updates,
which was deployed in late 2013 (with WordPress 3.7 [2]). We
speculate that those sites that did not automatically or quickly
manually update to a new version yet (which implicitly fixed
our targeted XSS vulnerabilities) perhaps were less actively
maintained (if at all), reducing the likelihood that our outreach
efforts would spur actions at those sites.
Git WP
Plain 403 25.8% 383 16.2%
S/MIME 351 22.5% 399 16.8%
Mailbot 403 25.8% 420 17.7%
Tracking 374 24.2% 375 15.8%
HTML 363 23.2% 379 16.0%
Friendly 75 20.4% 93 15.9%
Control 203 13.0% 336 14.2%
TABLE II. NON-EXPLOITABLE DOMAINS PER GROUP AND
VULNERABILITY BY MARCH 17TH, 2017
Timeline of Remediation — Figures 2 and 3 show the ratio
of fixed vulnerabilities for Git and WP over the course of
our notification campaign. The vertical lines denote the two
notification reminders sent.
For Git, we note distinct behavioral differences between
the control group and the notified groups. After two weeks,
an additional 7% of the notified groups had fixed on aver-
age, compared to the control group. After four weeks, this
improvement rose to 11% of the notified population, indicating
our first reminder messages spurred further viewed reports and
fixed sites. However, no further improvements occurred after
the second reminder message. This behavior contrasts slightly
with the re-notification results by Li et al. [19], who found
no increased remediation from a second round of messages
to network operators. We observe this effect occurred but only
after the second set of reports, reinforcing the notion that there
is a period after which notifications are no longer effective, but
that this period may be longer for webmasters than network
operators. This time period is likely due to recipients deciding
to not heed our messages, or never receiving our messages in
the first place (e.g., bounced emails or spam filters).
Amongst the notified Git groups, Plain and Mailbot reme-
diated at the highest levels, exhibiting commensurate perfor-
mance. The HTML and Tracking groups are likewise similar
but at a lower fix rate. Interestingly, even though its content
exactly matched the other plaintext emails, S/MIME performed
worse than HTML emails. The least effective notification
group was Friendly. We discuss implications of our findings
in the following section.
WP sites, in contrast, do not display drastic differences
between the notified and control groups across our entire
measurement window. We observe that the Mailbot group
performed best, followed by S/MIME and Plain. Again HTML
and Tracking show a similar fix rate. We hypothesize that
this may be due to the population characteristics we discussed
earlier, running older versions of WordPress without automatic
updates and without actively maintaining it.
Significance of Effects — To determine if our notification
efforts had a statistically significant impact on remediation,
we compared the fraction of the population remediated after
six weeks for each notified group with that of the control
group. Our null hypothesis was that the remediation levels
for a given notified group did not differ from that of the
control group. We use Fisher’s exact test to determine the
significance of the observed improvements, with a significance
threshold of α = 0.05. Since we test multiple hypotheses,
we must additionally perform multi-test corrections. Thus, we
apply the Holm-Bonferroni correction method [16]. Under this
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Fig. 4. Viewed reports for Git
correction approach, all m resulting hypothesis p-values are
ordered from lowest to highest. Let k be the minimal index in
the ordered p-value list such that pk > αm+1−k , where m = 6
and α = 0.05. The hypotheses corresponding to the first k−1
p-values (in order) are rejected while the rest are not.
Table III summarizes our significance test results. For Git,
we find that the null hypothesis is rejected for every notifi-
cation group, under the Holm-Bonferroni correction. Hence,
all notification variants show a significant improvement in
remediation for Git groups. In contrast, for WP, only the
Mailbot remediated at a statistically significantly higher level
(again after multi-test corrections). It must be noted though
that no group performed significantly better than all others.
Git WP
Plain 1.159 e-19 0.0570939
S/MIME 3.291 e-12 0.0114718
Mailbot 7.996 e-20 0.0008576
Tracking 9.971 e-16 0.1127060
HTML 1.156 e-13 0.0882801
Friendly 0.0004916 0.2948444
TABLE III. FISHER’S EXACT TEST p VALUES
B. Report Views and Conversion to Fixes Rate
Table IV shows the number (and fraction) of recipients per
notification group that accessed our report, and the likelihood
that they remediated conditioned on viewing the report.
For Git, we observe that the plaintext notification groups
exhibited an approximately 12% view rate. For HTML mails,
9-10% of the reports were accessed, indicating that the mail
format influenced report viewing (albeit not statistically signif-
icantly). Moreover, we find that the usage of a linked resource
did not result in differing user behavior when compared to an
HTML email with the image attached to it. Friendly had the
highest overall report access rate with 13%, possibly because
the initial message contained little technical information about
the security issue and required a response, but also since it did
not contain any links (which likely increases the spam score).
Figure 4 shows how reports were accessed over time. We do
observe a short burst of increased report accesses after our
reminders for all notified groups (similar to what we found
in prior work [25]), indicating that recipients do not wholesale
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Fig. 5. Viewed reports for WP
ignore our reminders. However, as noted earlier, this no longer
translated into additional remediation by the second reminder.
Across all message types, we find that Git Web site operators
who viewed our report were likely to remediate correctly, with
at least 72% of operators in each group addressing the issue.
Thus, if we can communicate our report information to a Web
site operator, we can likely spur positive actions.
For WP (Figure 5), we observe similar patterns in behav-
iors, with the Friendly group accessing the report at the highest
rate, followed by the plaintext message groups, and finally the
HTML message groups. Likewise, we observed increases in
report views after reminders. The overall view rates are lower
than with Git Web sites, as are the fix rates for those that did
view the reports (averaging to 36% of recipients who opened
our report). This aligns with our hypothesis that these WP sites
may be more poorly maintained or significantly out-of-date.
IV. IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS
Potential challenges for an email notification campaign
stem from a variety of aspects. On the one hand, emails might
not get delivered in the first place, either due to non-existing
mailboxes or spam filtering. On the other hand, even if a
message is delivered successfully to an inbox, it is unclear
whether we reached an appropriate point of contact, whether
the message itself is trusted by the recipient, and whether the
message conveys the proper information to spur the recipient
into taking the corrective steps. In the end, the operator may
make an educated decision to not fix the security issue, perhaps
to avoid compatibility problems or unplanned downtime. It is
important to recognize that such decision may arguably be the
correct decision in certain circumstances and environments,
depending on different cost-benefit considerations. Thus, 100%
remediation is not necessarily the ideal goal for a notification.
In this section, we investigate further these technical and
human aspects that affect a notification campaign’s success.
A. Technical Aspects
Bounced Emails — Unsurprisingly, widespread emailing to site
owners results in a number of bounced emails. For all notified
Git domains, 1,085/8,160 (13.3%) bounced all emails sent
to their corresponding addresses; for WordPress 1,906/12,442
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Git WP
Group Notified Viewed Viewed → Fixed Notified Viewed Viewed → Fixed
Plain 1,561 184 (11.79%) 144 (78.26%) 2,371 182 (7.68%) 60 (32.97%)
S/MIME 1,559 188 (12.06%) 152 (80.85%) 2,374 159 (6.70%) 66 (41.51%)
Mailbot 1,560 191 (12.24%) 145 (75.92%) 2,371 178 (7.51%) 63 (35.39%)
Tracking 1,548 154 (9.95%) 112 (72.73%) 2,370 118 (4.98%) 40 (33.90%)
HTML 1,565 141 (9.01%) 103 (73.05%) 2,371 126 (5.31%) 47 (37.30%)
Friendly 367 48 (13.08%) 37 (77.08%) 585 55 (9.40%) 18 (32.73%)
TABLE IV. NOTIFIED DOMAINS, VIEWED REPORTS (AND %), FIXED AFTER VIEW (VIEWED→ FIXED)
(15.3%) bounced all attempts. These bounce rates differ neg-
ligibly between different notification groups.
Spam Filtering — An email may also be stopped by a spam
filter while in transit to a recipient. To explore the impact
of spam filtering, we analyzed how email access rates for
Tracking differed across mail providers with likely different
spam filtering policies. Requests for the image embedded in
our message (each to a unique URL) allow us to approximate
the number of opened emails. In Table V, we summarize the
email access rates for the Git Tracking group bucketed by the
recipient mail provider, grouped by GMail, Microsoft-hosted
company mail servers, and all other providers. The results are
commensurate for WP, and elided for space.
For 477 domains, at least one email was sent to Google’s
mail servers. On Google’s GMail web interface, external
resources are retrieved by Google servers by default on email
open, except if the sender is deemed suspicious [15]. We
observe that the fraction of delivered emails that resulted in
image loads is four times higher for other mail providers com-
pared to GMail. Assuming the inherent email access levels are
similar for recipients using different providers, this significant
difference is likely due to either Google spam filtering or
blacklisting of our email sender. Based on the timestamps
of image loads for recipients using GMail, we believe our
email sender was not blacklisted as image loads continued
consistently for days after our messages were distributed. Thus
Google’s content-based spam filter appears to have filtered
out a significant fraction of our messages, highlighting the
significant impact spam filtering may have on security noti-
fications. While this observation may not be surprising, it is
important to note the operational similarities between security
notification campaigns and those done for marketing or spam.
Future coordination with mail providers may help distinguish
security notifications from other less desirable messages.
B. Human Aspects
Reasons for not Fixing Issues — As previously outlined, only
about one third of the operators that saw a report for their
WordPress installation actually fixed the problem afterward. To
better understand the reason behind this, we contacted these
operators in June, excluding those sites which did eventually
end up fixed. In contrast to our survey (see Section VI),
Provider Delivered Tracked Fraction
Google 477 49 10.2%
Microsoft 103 46 44.6%
Others 1,049 392 37.4%
TABLE V. TRACKING ANALYSIS PER PROVIDER FOR GIT
instead of providing an anonymous questionnaire, we reminded
operators about the unfixed vulnerabilities and asked if there
was anything we could do to help. In total, we contacted
360 domain operators this way. We only received a total
of 15 replies, but these nevertheless provided some insights.
Six domain operators said that they did not think it was
necessary to address the vulnerabilities, e.g., because they
were planning to move away from WordPress altogether. Three
answers indicated that the contact was not even aware of our
initial message, even though the report had been accessed
before. This is most likely due to larger teams handling such
issues, or churn in a site’s administrators. The remaining
reasons given were either that the recipient was not responsible
for the content (e.g., only registered the domain), upgrading
would have threatened compatibility with plugins, or that the
flaw had been addressed before but re-appeared (possibly
through misconfiguration of the web server). Moreover, one
recipient told us that he simply had forgotten about the problem
and another answered that our information was not trusted,
although they did follow the link to our web interface. As we
report in Section VI, our more methodical survey experiment
conveyed similar sentiments, particular on trust.
Correlating Update Frequency With Remediation — Word-
Press by default features an RSS feed, which is typically
accessible at domain.com/feed/ and shows recent site
changes such as new articles. We developed a small crawler
which allowed to us to retrieve this RSS feed, which features
the lastBuildDate field describing when the site’s content
was last updated. In total, we could gather this data for 660
domains in WP for which a report was accessed (for the rest,
the feed was disabled or the site was offline when we checked).
Out of these, 223 fixed the issue after having seen the report,
while 427 did not. For each domain, we then extracted the
number of days since the last content update relative to June
1st, 2017. Subsequently, we calculated the average time for
those domains that fixed and those that did not.
We found that sites which remediated after accessing a re-
port updated an average of 60 days priors, whereas vulnerable
domains averaged 115 days since their last update. This in
line with our hypothesis that webmasters of vulnerable WP
sites who do not react skew towards those that less actively
maintain their site or run such an outdated WordPress version
that updating is rife with compatibility issues.
We conducted the same analysis for the control group,
finding minimal differences in the time since the last update be-
tween those who ended up fixing versus those who did not (119
days for fixed domains, 109 days for still vulnerable domains).
These values are similar to the domains who did not remediate
after viewing a report, suggesting similar populations.
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Git WP
Read Fix % Fix Read Fix % Fix
Email Read 490 183 37.35% 642 113 17.60%
and Report Not Viewed 361 87 24.10% 546 81 14.84%
and Report Viewed 129 96 74.42% 96 32 33.33%
TABLE VI. FIX RATES OF VIEWED EMAILS IN Tracking
C. Tracking Analysis
The purpose of our Tracking group was primarily to under-
stand the conversion rate of email access compared to report
views. Table VI summarizes the remediation behavior condi-
tioned on email and report views. The top row Email Read
shows the total number of domains for which we verified that
the email was read. The two other rows distinguish between
domains that did and did not view the report, respectively.
From Reading an Email to Viewing a Report — For Git, from a
total of 1,548 Tracking notified domains, our email was opened
by (at least) 490 domain operators. Note that this email reading
rate of 32% represents a lower bound, as recipients might
have also read the email without loading the external content
in the email. Of these verified readers, only 129 recipients
viewed our online report or requested it via email. This yields
a report access rate of 26%. Apart from the 129 accesses after
the hit on our tracking image, an additional 25 reports were
accessed without retrieving the image. For WP, out of 2,370
Tracking domains, 642 domains had at least one email read
(email reading rate of 27%), leading to 96 viewed reports
(report access rate of 15%); here, we observed an additional
22 viewed reports without the tracked image.
These findings are sobering, as they show that even if an
email was read, only 15–26% would investigate further by
viewing the report. Thus, even after overcoming the technical
challenges of successfully delivering a message to a recipient’s
inbox, there are human factors such as lack of trust or misun-
derstanding the information conveyed that reduce remediation
rates (although again, some recipients may have made an
informed decision towards inaction). Judging from the results
that our previous work had with including the whole message
in the body instead of a link [19, 25], we believe that the
external link only played a minor role in these results.
Fix Rates — Considering only those domains for which a
report was viewed (and the email was opened), we observe
that 74.42% and 33.33% of the issues were addressed for Git
and WP, respectively. This is in line with the results for all
other groups. The fix rate for WP domains which did receive
our email, but did not open the linked report, are in line with
the results for the control group (see Table II). Notably, the
outcome is different for the Git domains who opened the
email but did not view the report: 24.7% of these domains
remediated. This is significantly higher than the 13.0% fix ratio
exhibited by the Git control group, which may suggest that
recipients already had enough information to handle the case
even without accessing our detailed reports.
The difference in the fix rates may be due to the varying na-
ture of the security issues. While the Git version control system
requires a certain level of technical expertise to use, WordPress
can be installed by a non-technical user. Thus, site operators
for Git domains may skew towards a better understanding of
Git WP
Alias Read (Viewed) Fraction R. Read (Viewed) Fraction R.
info 134 (16) 8.7% 189 (18) 8.0%
abuse 79 (23) 5.1% 80 (6) 3.4%
webmaster 87 (23) 5.6% 76 (9) 3.2%
security 26 (3) 1.7% 36 (7) 1.5%
WHOIS 254 (42) 16.4% 302 (38) 12.7%
TABLE VII. READ EMAILS AND VIEWED REPORTS THEREAFTER,
GROUPED BY GENERIC ALIASES/WHOIS CONTACT
the technical details about the reported issue compared to WP
webmasters. This may also explain the higher Git fix rate even
when viewing only the email. Additionally, our hypothesis that
the vulnerable WP sites are less actively maintained and run
outdated software may also be a contributing factor.
Usefulness of Generic Alias Addresses — RFC-specified
generic email aliases (such as security@) may not be con-
sistently available. To evaluate their effectiveness, we compare
the fraction of address recipients that accessed our emails and
our reports for WHOIS contacts versus generic aliases.
Our findings for email accesses are shown in Table VII.
We note that the total number of viewed reports from generic
aliases exceeds group sizes in Table VI, because a site might
access the report from messages received at multiple aliases.
Notably, the least effective alias appeared to be the security
alias, whereas info was most effective. This can be explained
in part by the fact that for the first round of notifications, 85%
of the emails to security bounced, while for info, the
bounce rate was only at 62%. Nevertheless, this highlights that
a dedicated security email address is hard to reach. Moreover,
it seems like the WHOIS contact information is more useful,
allowing us to deliver the initial notification to 12.7% and
16.4% of the WP and Git sites, respectively.
The table also shows the number of domains for which a
report was accessed after the email was opened. While the
overall numbers are generally low, it is worth noting that
for Git, abuse and webmaster had the highest number
of viewed reports, even though they did not have the highest
number of emails opened. Hence, while it appears that these
aliases are not as easy to reach as info, recipients of the
technical email addresses might have a better understanding
of the issue described, prompting them to view the report.
D. Parameters for the Success of a Notification Campaign
The dimensions of potential biases introduced by tracking
users are unclear. One could argue that security-aware recip-
ients would have external resource retrieval disabled in their
mail client. Yet we discovered that several mail clients, such as
Apple Mail and GMail, enable such external resources by de-
fault. Thus, under the assumption that the results we gathered
at least approximate the whole population of vulnerable sites
we notified, the analysis shows that the success of a notification
campaign depends largely on three key factors:
1) The email reading rate heavily depends on how many
emails are successfully delivered to the inbox of the
recipient and sets the basis for the campaign’s success.
2) The awareness raising factor of the campaign sets the
baseline for people being aware of the security problem,
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largely influenced by the recipient’s trust in the email and,
consequently, if she considers the reported vulnerabilities
as serious (e.g., by viewing the detailed report).
3) The aware-to-fix rate, which was high (above 75%) for
Git, can be influenced by the type of report and type of
vulnerability and represents the chance that an issue is
fixed after the report was viewed (or the target became
aware of the issue implicitly by seeing our email).
Regarding the email reading rate, our observations show
that it is independent of the type of vulnerability. We found
the bounce rates and tracking rates are comparable between
Git and WP. We note however that Stock et al. [25] also
considered Client-Side XSS issues focusing on highly-popular
sites (i.e., the Alexa Top 10,000). For them, the bounce
rates varied between WordPress (Alexa Top 1m) and Client-
Side XSS bugs (Alexa Top 10k). We believe that the email
reading rate is independent of the type of vulnerability, but
is influenced by the popularity of a Web site. Moreover, we
showed that Google Mail in particular exhibited a much lower
tracking rate than other mail servers. This is likely caused by
more restrictive filtering rules employed by Google, especially
compared to Microsoft mail services. At the same time, of the
103,189 emails we sent for our first round of notifications,
21,380 (21%) were delivered to Google. Considering only
those emails which did not bounce due to a non-existing
mailbox, 12,336/40,002 (31%) of successful deliveries went to
a Google mail exchange. Hence, if our messages were flagged
as possible spam by Google, this single service had a severe
impact on the success of our campaign. To solve such an issue,
large-scale notification campaigns can aim to collaborate with
larger email providers to achieve a higher coverage of mail
servers flagging the emails as benign.
The second parameter, i.e., the ability to raise awareness of
a vulnerability issue, is hard to measure. One way of doing so
is looking at the likelihood of a recipient actually viewing the
report. However, from our experience, this view rate depends
on the type of vulnerability (and implicitly also the type
of administrator). The fraction of operators who opened our
emails and subsequently visited the contained link varied from
15% to 26%. A possible explanation for the difference is
the audience of the notifications: for Git, the expected tech-
savviness is higher than for an operator of a WP domain. In
fact, although it contained important technical information on
how to fix the vulnerability, only about one in six recipients
who opened an email in our WP data set also visited the
Web site. Second, after reading our initial notification email, it
might not be necessary to fetch further information by reading
a report, which also influences the view rate.
Finally, the aware-to-fix rate is significantly lower than the
optimum rate of near 100%. We showed (similar to previous
work [19, 25]) that even viewing the detailed report about a
security issue does not always result in a fixed site. Especially
for WordPress, fix rates of sites that viewed the report were
around 40%, showing that 60% of the sites do not fix the issue
even when aware of it. For Git, the fix rate was much higher
at around 80%. It appears that there are two major factors for
the low fix rate on WordPress. First, notified site operators
might not have been able to understand the implications of the
disclosed vulnerabilities. Arguably, researchers should try to
better understand what level of detail is needed for the expected
type of recipient. Second, they might not have considered
these a risk for their sites. This is partially underlined by the
responses we received to the emails we sent to operators who
had not fixed their sites despite viewing a report. Six out of
15 respondents stated that they were not going to address the
vulnerability due to the limited risk they associated with the
issues. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the perceived
risk associated with the type of disclosed issue influences the
fraction of fixed sites and our results should be re-evaluated
with other types of vulnerabilities.
V. NOTIFYING MANUALLY ACQUIRED CONTACTS
So far we used contact points which could be automatically
deduced (e.g., generic aliases) or retrieved from a database
(e.g., WHOIS data). Furthermore, with email, we used a fully-
automated communication channel. However, following this
procedure did not perform in a satisfactory manner when
considering the fraction of contacts that were successfully
reached. In this section, we study how alternative communi-
cation channels can help to improve this situation.
A. Experiment Parameters
As outlined in the following, the alternative communication
channels we chose require significant manual effort to collect
contact points or to perform the notification. We therefore
randomly sampled 1,000 vulnerable domains which were in
an unknown state by April 10th, 2017, i.e., had not accessed
a report, had not retrieved the external resource linked in
our email and had not bounced all emails. We selected these
domains before excluding core dumps from our experiments,
which slightly reduces the final set to 970 domains.
B. Manual Communication Channels
In the following, we briefly outline each of the manual
communication channels we selected. To find such a channel,
we manually analyzed the vulnerable Web sites to extract as
many of the available contact points as possible. In total, this
task required about 40 person hours to complete.
Postal — The first manual channel is postal snail mail. We,
therefore, searched either for a contact page or an imprint
to retrieve the postal address associated with a Web site. In
case more than one address could be found (e.g., because
a company had multiple offices), we prioritized locations in
English-speaking countries. For the letters, we used the address
format of the destination country, most importantly also the
character set (e.g., for China or Russia). Since the recipient had
to manually type the URL to the vulnerability report, we set up
shortened URLs with site-unique six-character tokens. Apart
from this shortened URL, we used the same template as for
the automated disclosure via email. For all manuals channels
described in the following, we also used the shortened URLs.
Email — Another manual channel was again email, but this
time contacting email addresses contained on the Web site that
had to be searched manually. Whenever we discovered more
than one email address on a site, we used the one which most
closely resembled an administrator. In many cases, however,
we had to resort to a general contact@ alias. Once an email
address was retrieved, we followed the exact procedure of the
Plain group to send an email.
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Web forms — Some Web sites offer HTML-based forms to
get into contact. In such cases, we either used general purpose
forms or if the form was guided (i.e., we had to select a reason
for our contact request) we used the topic which most closely
resembled security. Whenever possible, we provided our full
names, affiliation, postal address, phone number, and email to
allow for the notified party to get back to us.
Social Media — We tried to find the social media accounts on
Facebook and Twitter that belong to the Web site. While on
Facebook, directly messaging a person or company is possible,
Twitter does not allow sending direct messages to users that are
not following the sender. Therefore, on Twitter we send an @
message to the account, asking them to contact us via email so
that we could disclose the vulnerability. In both cases, instead
of setting up a new account without any friends or followers,
we used two of the authors’ well-established real accounts to
convey trust in the sender.
Phone Numbers — Finally, we chose to call vulnerable sites
to disclose the issues. Similar to postal mail, we selected the
phone number which was most likely to reach an English-
speaking person (e.g., a US or UK-based office). We then
determined the best time to call the remote party based on
their timezone. When calling, we first established whether the
person on the other end understood English. If not, we asked
to speak to somebody who could, or ended the call if no such
person was available. Once we reached someone who could
speak English, we told them our affiliation and that we had
discovered a vulnerability on their site. We inquired whether
they would be the right person to speak to about this and if not,
asked to be forwarded. If the correct person was not available
via phone, we asked them to either give us their email address
or to send us an email. Unless specifically asked, we did not
disclose any more information on the actual vulnerability over
the phone but rather sent the report via email.
C. Availability of Manual Channels and Group Assignment
Table VIII shows the fraction of domains for which we
could find any of the aforementioned contact channels, split
for Git and WordPress. This table reveals a notable insight:
approximately half of all the domains do not provide an
email address. Previous work on notification has, however,
always focused on using emails as the main channel to reach
administrators. Yet, it appears that at least for the snapshot of
our data used for this experiment, site admins prefer not to be
contacted via email.
Apart from this, we observe that both types of considered
Web sites, i.e., those using Git and those run on WordPress,
provide at least one communication channel in about 90%
of the cases. Hence, it arguably is possible to retrieve a
contact point for almost any domain in need of a vulnerability
notification. However, looking up such information at scale is
not feasible. Moreover, considering that calling sites or sending
them postal mail incurs costs, we will discuss if the benefit can
outweigh these costs in the following.
To avoid any bias in the selection of a channel, we
randomly assigned each domain in the data set to any of the
aforementioned channels. After this, we determined whether
a given domain could be contacted via that channel, i.e.,
whether there was such a contact point for it. If it could
Channel Git Config WordPress
Postal 38.4% 32.0%
Email 57.1% 45.6%
Web forms 36.1% 39.2%
Social Media 52.8% 46.1%
Phone 43.4% 33.6%
At least one 89.9% 89.3%
TABLE VIII. AVAILABILITY OF COMM. CHANNELS CONTACTS
not be contacted, we removed that domain from any further
consideration. Hence, of the 970 domains, only 364 could be
contacted manually. The number of domains for each channel
are shown in Table IX in the Cont. columns.
D. Success of Our Manual Notification
After the assignment of the groups, we started our manual
notification on April 11th with Social Media, Web forms, and
target-specific email. We received no bounces for any email
we sent. The next day we called the sites in the phone group.
The same evening, we prepared the letters, which were sent
out on April 13th. We ended our measurements on May 23rd.
The overall results of our manual notification are depicted
in Table IX, showing the number of contacted domains, reports
accessed, and fixed domains (after having accessed a report)
for Git and WordPress, respectively. Notably, the email ad-
dresses collected from the Web sites did not appear to be useful
for notifications. Given that we contacted only such domains
for which we had previously no information whether they
received our message in the first place, two reasons might have
come into play. First, our email triggered the same technical
measures as before (e.g., spam filters). Second, our email was
already received the first time we sent it, but disregarded as
untrustworthy. Regardless of the reason, even using manually-
vetted addresses did not increase the effectiveness of emails.
For Git, the most successful channels were postal and
phone, leading to 23% and 25% accessed reports, respectively.
At the same time, these channels are the most expensive ones.
For WordPress, we find that Social Media performed best,
followed by the phone channel. However, the generally low
number of reactions do not allow for a meaningful comparison
to the automated notification. Nevertheless, we observe that the
respective best channels appeared to reach more administrators
than our original email campaign.
E. Discussion
The goal of this experiment was to determine if alternative
channels could be used to improve vulnerability notifications.
For 90% of the domains, at least one such channel could
Git Config WordPress
Channel Cont. Reports Fixed Cont. Reports Fixed
Postal 30 7 (23.3%) 5 37 3 (8.1%) 1
Email 48 0 (0.0%) 0 43 0 (0.0%) 0
Web forms 29 6 (20.7%) 4 40 2 (5.0%) 1
Social Media 36 5 (16.7%) 1 55 7 (12.7%) 3
Phone 20 5 (25.0%) 2 26 3 (11.5%) 2
Total 163 23 (14.1%) 12 201 15 (7.5%) 7
TABLE IX. RESULTS OF MANUAL NOTIFICATION
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be established. Seeing the effort of manual notifications, they
yield a comparatively low success rate. Using the best available
channels, i.e., postal and phone for Git as well as social media
and phone for WordPress, we managed to reach a slightly
higher fraction of reports compared to our regular notification
campaign. However, it remains unclear how to determine the
best alternative channel in beforehand.
At the same time, we must consider the cost of this
notification. Apart from approximately 60 hours of work to
conduct 364 notifications manually (approx. 40 hours to look
up contacts for all 970 domains, 10 hours for the phone calls,
5 hours for letters and 5 hours for social network and Web
forms), we spent both postage and telephone costs. Moreover,
of the 67 letters we sent, 18 were returned to us because
a non-existing recipient. We thus argue that such a manual
notification can by no means be considered cost-efficient when
trying to notify an even larger number of sites.
VI. SURVEY
Following our automated and manual notifications, we sent
anonymous surveys (see our GitHub repository [1]) to all
notification recipients who did not opt-out of our experiments,
as described in Section II-D. Here, we analyze the responses
and distill the insights they provide.
A. Summary of Survey Submissions
We distributed a distinct survey to each notification re-
sponse group (which were based on their interactions with our
notifications and their remediation status). This allowed us to
track the anonymous survey answers per response group. The
sets of questions for each survey were identical, except for
an additional question for response groups that did not fix
the vulnerability, asking for the reasons they did not address
the issue. Note all survey questions were optional, typically
resulting in fewer question answers than submitted surveys.
Across our six response groups, we received a total of
193 submitted surveys, and an additional 232 initiated but not
submitted surveys. However, these submissions were primarily
from two response groups. Notification recipients who viewed
our vulnerability report Web site and also fixed a vulner-
ability (a group we label as REPORT FIXED) contributed
162 submissions (and an additional 150 other views). The
high submission rate for this group is unsurprising given they
were most likely to have observed and responded to our prior
notification efforts. More unexpected was that the response
group with the second most survey answers was those who
did not appear to view our email and did not address the
issues (which we label as NOREAD NOFIX). They completed
27 surveys (with 59 incomplete ones). This indicates that a
number of these email contacts were active, despite the fact
we could not verify they had read the email.
The remaining response groups provided two or fewer sub-
missions, with 12 or fewer total views. These are surprisingly
low reply rates, as some response groups include those we
observed as having viewed our report Web site or opened the
notification message, indicating the email addresses were at
least active. Even though we randomly distributed the order
of the sent out emails and regularly checked for the presence
of our mail server in well-known IP blacklists, our messages
containing a link to the survey page might have been detected
as spam by mail servers. Since we conducted our survey in
an anonymous fashion, it is impossible to determine whether
specific mail servers were more likely to flag our mail as spam.
However, we assume that the impact of this is similar to what
we had observed for the notifications in the Tracking group,
i.e., that likely Google’s mail servers might have flagged more
of our messages as spam. Given this distribution of survey
submissions, we cannot assume our findings generalize to all
contacts, but they can provide insights nonetheless.
B. Respondent Demographics
We asked respondents to self-describe the type of Web
site their organization maintains and the nature of their or-
ganization. The most popular response was that the Web
site was a corporate or business homepage. Over a third of
contacts (66 out of 162) in the REPORT FIXED group self-
reported this answer, as did 6 out of 27 (22%) of those in
the NOREAD NOFIX group. This indicates that exploitation
of our Web site vulnerabilities may have financial implica-
tions, potentially compromising businesses or harming their
customers. Thus, our reported vulnerabilities can have a note-
worthy impact. Other notable Web site categories included
personal or blog pages, e-commerce Web sites, community
forums, online services, and academic institution homepages,
although none of these categories accounted for more than 7%
of respondents.
C. Security Response Manpower
The availability of security personnel to address Web vul-
nerabilities impacts the effectiveness of security notifications.
For example, Web sites with only one webmaster tasked with
responding to vulnerability reports may struggle to properly
address all issues. We asked respondents to disclose the num-
ber of personnel tasked with responding to security incidents or
security notifications, as well as the number of people directly
responsible for administrating or maintaining the Web site.
The survey responses indicate a Web site typically has few
administrators who handle security issues, less so than the total
number of webmasters. Out of the 173 answers we received
regarding personnel, 92 Web sites (53%) indicated there was
only one security administrator, 66 (38%) indicated there were
two to five such webmasters, and 9 (5%) indicate no one was
tasked with handling security incidents. Only 6 responses indi-
cate there were five or more security personnel. In comparison,
101 Web sites (58%) had two to five webmasters, 56 (32%)
had a single Web site maintainer, and two responses indicated
no one managed the Web site. 14 (8%) indicated more than
five people helped run the Web site.
D. Acceptability of Detection and Notification
It is vital to understand whether our vulnerability scans and
subsequent notifications are acceptable to those we contact. A
negative answer would argue against the practice of notifica-
tion. To assess this, we asked respondents to indicate whether
they found it acceptable to detect security issues on their
Web site and whether it was acceptable for us to notify them
about any detected problems. We additionally asked if they
would find such notifications useful in the future. Naturally,
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this carries a sampling bias, given that recipients who found
our message helpful would be more willing to take our survey.
Our responses were almost universally positive. Over 98%
of respondents (178 out of 181) indicated detection was
allowed, and only 1 out of 185 survey answers (0.5%) indicated
security notifications were unacceptable. These notifications
were not only acceptable, they were deemed helpful, as
99% (181 out of 183) surveys showed they would find our
notifications useful in the future. Our survey responses may
suffer from response bias, such that those who feel strongly
positive or negative are more likely to complete our survey.
However, the nearly universally positive responses suggest that
these notifications are well-received. In addition, we received
numerous thanks in the survey’s free response comments. This
conclusion is in line with prior security notification stud-
ies [13, 19], which have also reported positive interactions with
the vast majority of notification recipients (through surveys and
notification follow-on communication).
E. Proper Points of Contact
Our notification efforts have illuminated the challenges
in even establishing contact with the maintainers of a site.
To gain insight on the proper points of contact, we inquired
as to the best point(s) of contact for each respondent. We
observe a wide range of responses, although the WHOIS
technical email contact and site-listed emails appeared to be
the predominantly preferred contacts. 123 respondents marked
the WHOIS technical contact as appropriate, and 115 did so
for email contacts listed on the site. Other popular options
included the WHOIS abuse contact (59 replies) and Web forms
(55). For the remaining options we listed, including social
media, as well as snail mail addresses and phone numbers
(both in WHOIS records and on the site), between 15 and 25
respondents designated those as reasonable contact points.
This range of responses highlights the difficulty in reliably
reaching the appropriate webmaster, as different Web sites may
be best notified at different points of contact. It also provides
guidance towards future notification efforts, such as utilizing
emails scraped from Web sites or automating Web site form
submissions. Also of note is the popularity of the WHOIS
technical email compared to the WHOIS abuse contact. The
difference is drastic, even when considering the possibility that
some respondents may have mistaken (or did not distinguish)
between the two. This counters the intuition used in prior
notification studies [6, 13, 19, 25, 26] which have utilized the
abuse contact, considering it more security-relevant.
F. Trust as a Factor
Our remaining survey questions attempted to assess the
qualities and characteristics of our notification messages.
While there was a diverse set of feedback, a common theme
emerged of trust in the notification. A number of notification
recipients did not immediately react or dismissed our message
as initially untrustworthy, and those who eventually did heed
our notification indicated it was after some investigation to
confirm its validity. Such negative perception of a vulnerability
report naturally can significantly limit its effectiveness.
There were three common characteristics of our notification
that were most frequently discussed as impacting its trust-
worthiness. First was the message sender, which 14 survey
submissions explicitly stated was either unfamiliar or lacked
an established trustworthy reputation. One respondent said
“As an American, Saarland University was not a school I
had heard of before.” Others stated that the notifications
could be improved if we were to “build up a reputation
to make them seem less dodgy and more trustworthy,” or
“use a trusted brand to rely on.” Several of those that noted
they did not recognize the sender also discussed needing to
investigate to confirm the legitimacy of the notification source.
For example, one respondent recalled that they “had to google
you to know it was not phishing” while another suggested
providing “instructions on how to verify the authenticity of the
sender.” These replies indicate that the sender may impact a
notification’s effectiveness, a conclusion that conflicts with the
study from Cetin et al. [6], which experimented with several
different notification senders and found that sender reputation
did not appear to affect remediation rates. Further investigation
into this factor is needed, as our survey responses suggest that
trust in the sender is an important consideration.
The second characteristic of our notification that survey
recipients noted was the use of an external link. Email links,
particularly from unknown senders, can appear suspicious as
they can lead to phishing or malware domains. As our notifi-
cation’s report link was hosted at a university’s domain, those
who were unfamiliar with the institution or its domain could be
wary of clicking on it. One survey submission advised “Don’t
try to link me to an external site. This makes me immediately
think it may be a phishing attempt.” Another expressed similar
sentiments: “I wouldn’t have acted if there wasn’t something
verifiable inside of the e-mail, or if it required following
anything from the e-mail or accessing any attachments.” These
replies suggest that a notification message should encompass
the entire vulnerability report. While perhaps external links to
information pages (or sites that validate the sender) could still
be provided, recipients should not have to visit these to obtain
the necessary information. This corresponds with the findings
of Li et al. [19], who found that more detailed notification
messages resulted in improved remediation behavior.
A final quality widely mentioned was the similarity to
phishing or spam emails. In fact, 10 notification recipients
indicated they found our notification originally in their spam
folders, which likely grossly under-represents the true fraction
as those who never observed our initial notification were
unlikely to respond to our survey (or perhaps our survey
message itself was relegated to spam). Numerous comments
touched on their suspicions, such as:
• “At first this email was considered rather suspicious
(spam / phishing / malware). We checked it with extreme
caution.”
• “I ignored first one as spam/phishing but reacted to the
friendly reminder followup.”
• “My initial instinct was your email was spam and/or some
kind of attack itself, but I quickly realized it was real.”
• “Risk to read it as spam due to lots of false security mails
from no-trust-senders.”
Also, several replies indicated they had poor past expe-
riences with some less benevolent parties claiming to have
relevant security information. One person recounted “I have
been contacted in the past by bug bounty hunters who hounded
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me for payment for vulnerabilities they found in another site
I run.” Another explained “Lots and lots of emails I receive
claim to be attempts to alert me about something, and it is
usually a veiled sales pitch for something like SEO services.”
This illuminates a challenge for these administrators in filtering
out legitimate notifications.
From this, it is apparent that the appearance of the no-
tification message is also a vital consideration, as it needs
to distinguish itself from spam and phishing messages. One
potential solution was proposed by five responders, who sug-
gested using more professionally designed or HTML-based
messages. Another might be to switch to a subscription model,
where webmasters subscribe to vulnerability notifications. This
suggestion was proposed in seven comments, which explained
that such a model would result in increased trust in both
the sender and the received messages. Overall, future work
on notifications should investigate not just the method of
conducting notifications, but the design of the notification
message itself, with an emphasis on establishing trust.
VII. QUO VADIS, VULNERABILITY NOTIFICATIONS?
While the majority of domains we notified about remained
unfixed, a significant fraction did correct the issues, showing
the promise of notifications. This aligns with the results from
Stock et al. [25] and Li et al. [19]. Moreover, our survey
responses indicated strongly positive reception to our efforts.
The research into large-scale security notifications is still in
its infancy though. In this section, we outline challenges we
identified from our study as well as previous work, laying a
roadmap for what future work could focus on.
A. Better Delivery Mediums
In nearly all works related to large-scale notifications,
the authors faced similar technical hurdles. One of the main
challenges was in identifying an appropriate email address to
contact (in an automated manner). We likewise faced these
issues, resulting in a large number of bounces for generic
aliases. Particularly sobering was the 85% bounce rate for
the security@ alias. Even though we could extract contact
information from the WHOIS entries for some of the affected
domains, these at times pointed to an Internet registrar, hosting
provider, or WHOIS privacy proxy. Yet, the respondents to our
survey stated that the WHOIS technical contact should prove
most useful in trying to reach the administrator. In addition,
our experiences with alternative communication channels have
not found one superior to email.
Relying on large volumes of emails also increases the risk
that the sending mail server becomes blacklisted. We witnessed
that the most popular mail service, i.e., Google, likely flagged
a substantial fraction of our messages as spam, although it
is unclear precisely how the volume of sent emails affected
the spam filtering decisions. Hence, having dedicated security
contacts, possibly accessible via WHOIS or RDAP [22], could
prove helpful in successfully delivering notifications.
Apart from email-based notifications, the use of vulnera-
bility reward programs (VRPs) has been studied by previous
works, showing that they are very effective [14]. From the
responses to our survey, we also learned that site operators
could be reached more easily if they could opt-in to a service,
instead of receiving unsolicited notifications. While effective,
VRPs incur additional costs for domain operators. Thus, it
seems unlikely that a large enough number of domains will
register for already existing VRPs to provide a complete so-
lution. However, future efforts could attempt to run low effort
and cheap services that provide vulnerability information.
B. Increasing Trust in Notifications
An over-arching issue faced by security notifications is a
lack of trust in the message or the sender. While Cetin et al.
[6] concluded that the sender does not impact the effectiveness
of a notification campaign, our work paints a different picture.
From the messages we received throughout our campaign as
well as the responses to our survey, we repeatedly saw cases
where trust was a vital concern. Domain operators explained
that they were often contacted by malicious parties, either
trying to sell services or products, or attempting to phish
the recipients. Our security notifications appeared similar in
nature, as they too were unsolicited. In addition, we received
feedback that our sending institution was not well-known to the
recipients and from their perspective, our email lacked means
to verify our identity (even with our signed email variant).
Thus, technical means to verify identities (such as digital
signatures) are themselves insufficient in establishing trust.
From these sentiments, we suggest that future notification
efforts should consider partnering with well-known organi-
zations, such as Google. As a case in point, Li et al. [20]
used Google’s Search Console program to notify hijacked
webmasters, observing some of the highest remediation levels
from prior notification works (about 80% of webmasters took
action). From a research perspective though, an interesting
direction is exploring how to establish this trust independently.
Some survey participants mentioned that the external links in
our messages decreased its trustworthiness. However, Stock
et al. [25] experimented with removing linked resources and
disclosing all technical details in the notification email itself,
observing lower fix rates. Hence, there is room for future work
on establishing more trust in the notification messages.
C. Tailoring Notification Content to the Recipients
In our work, we considered two types of issues that affected
different types of operators. On the one hand, WordPress can
be easily installed by almost anyone, as it merely requires
downloading the packed source and following the setup in-
structions. On the other hand, use of Git implies that the site
operates on source code which requires versioning. Intuitively,
Git usage requires a higher degree of technical expertise than
setting up a WordPress installation. Thus, it is possible that
WordPress users might benefit most from different information
than more technical Git users. Additionally, different tones
or message presentations (perhaps to catch the attention of,
establish trust with, or further incentivize recipients) may have
varying success depending on the notified population.
D. Cost Effectiveness
Setting up the infrastructure to automatically detect and no-
tify on security issues at scale is a non-trivial but front-loaded
cost, as each subsequent notification campaign can rely on the
existing infrastructure. However, our work (as well as prior
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studies) have shown that these fully automated approaches
yield suboptimal results. Thus in our study, we investigated the
feasibility of utilizing other means of communication, which
incur additional costs (either financial or manual effort) that
scale linearly with the number of notified sites.
In our experiment, the Friendly channel had the highest
fraction of viewed reports for both types of security issues.
However, the definition of viewed is different from the other
treatment groups, as this merely means that we sent an email
with the report, and not that somebody actually saw the details.
This manual approach did not exhibit the highest fix rates
for the issues we disclosed, thus was not worth the effort.
Similarly, our manual notifications showed comparable results
in helping administrators in fixing their sites but incurred
even higher financial or manpower costs. From the cost-benefit
tradeoff, automated email notifications are still our best option.
In general, investigating the economics of notifications is
an interesting future research direction. Are there incentives
that can drive up remediation rates, such as through policy
or legal changes? Alternatively, certain parties may be more
receptive to notifications and could be prioritized for them.
For example, we observed that WordPress sites that updated
more frequently were more likely to fix in response to our
notification. By considering the costs and benefits of various
notification parameters, future research could identify areas of
improvement for security notifications.
VIII. RELATED WORK
For decades, the research community has extensively fo-
cused on discovering various issues, such as in Web ap-
plications (e.g., [4, 10, 18, 27]) and Internet servers (e.g.,
[3, 9, 12]). However, only relatively recently has the secu-
rity community begun exploring the effectiveness of outreach
efforts to inform affected parties and spur remediation.
One area of focus by these recent notification efforts is
on incidents of compromise. In 2012, Vasek and Moore [26]
investigated abuse reports to malware domains and how the
level of detail in the report influenced cleanup rates. They
found that 55% of all contacted domains cleaned up compared
to 45% of unnotified sites. However, those who received
detailed reports performed the highest, cleaning up 62% of
their sites. In 2013, Canali et al. [5] studied how hosting
providers handle such reports. For 20 hosting providers, they
hosted Web sites serving malware and self-reported each site
to the corresponding hosting provider, observing that 64%
of the complaints were ignored. Similarly, Nappa et al. [21]
notified 19 hosting providers about malicious servers in their
network; however, only 7 actually took steps to take down the
affected servers. Cetin et al. [6] analyzed the role of sender
reputation on the success of malware cleanup behavior, using
different sender names and email aliases. They did not strong
evidence that the sender influences remediation, although their
total population was 480 contacts (across multiple treatment
groups). Recently, Li et al. [20] showed communicating with
webmasters of hijacked Web sites via Google Search Console
increased the clean-up rates by 50% (to approximately 80%
of sites) and reduced infection lifetimes by 60%. This finding
reinforces our notion that notifications rely on reliable points
of contact, as Search Console can provide a higher fidelity
delivery medium.
To proactively thwart future security problems, notifica-
tions can also target parties running vulnerable or misconfig-
ured software. Durumeric et al. [13] discovered and notified
servers susceptible to the 2014 Heartbleed bug, a vulnerability
that received much public attention. Conducting an A/B no-
tification experiment two weeks after public disclosure, they
found that notifications resulted in a 50% increase in patching.
Similarly, Ku¨hrer et al. [17] contacted administrators running
services susceptible to DDoS amplification attacks. Within 7
weeks, 90% of the 9 million discovered servers could not
longer be used for amplification attacks. A contributing factor
was that the authors also coordinated with large backbone
Internet providers, who began filtering potential amplification-
inducing packets (such as NTP monlist requests) before they
could reach vulnerable servers, thus potentially masking the
true patch rate.
In 2016, two concurrent works reported on large-scale
controlled notification experiments for vulnerable Web servers
(Stock et al. [25]) and network misconfigured hosts (Li et al.
[19]), exploring different factors that may affect a notification
campaign’s success. Both observed clear improvements in re-
mediation levels, but noted the challenges of reliably reaching
an appropriate point of contact and inciting further corrective
actions. Most recently in 2017, Cetin et al. [7] investigated
whether providing a mechanism to verify vulnerability could
encourage further remediation. They found that those who
visited their demonstration Web site were more likely to fix,
but only 10% of contacts visited. They observed high bounce
rates indicating a significant fraction of their notifications did
not reach anyone. The goal of our work is to investigate
and provide insights on the challenges these prior works
have observed, to provide a roadmap for improved future
notification efforts.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have reported on a notification experiment
targeting more than 24,000 domains, with the goal of shedding
light on why the success of vulnerability notifications is more
limited than ideal. By exploring a variety of facets surrounding
these notifications, including the channel of communication,
the message presentation, and Web site operator perspectives,
we have concretely identified several challenges that inhibit
a notification campaign’s success. Our results and insights
help lay the groundwork for future work in making security
notifications more successful. In summary, our main takeaways
are as follows:
• Email as a communication medium suffers from several
shortcomings, including technical (e.g., anti-spam filters)
and non-technical hurdles (e.g., lack of sender trust).
However, the minimal increases in the success of alter-
native and less automated notification channels (such as
phone, postal mail, or web forms) do not justify their
significant financial costs and time overheads.
• We empirically validated that sender trust does have
a significant influence on success, contrasting previous
work [6]. It is not only vital that recipients trust a notifi-
cation message, but also that email providers distinguish
and discard truly unwanted spam and phishing emails.
• We identified a large gap between being aware of a
security problem and addressing it. The fraction of sites
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that fixed a problem after learning about it differed per
group, ranging from about 33% of vulnerable WordPress
sites to 81% of sites with overly public Git folders. This
highlights that reaching out to affected parties is only
half of the battle, and the message itself is important
in convincing operators to take action. Moreover, future
work should investigate what level of technical detail is
required depending on the type of vulnerability being
reported.
We hope that future research such as those outlined in
Section VII can address some of these challenges to pave the
way to more successful security notifications.
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